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1. Introduction 
 
Our understanding of the impact of core labor rights, specifically the rights to 
freedom of association and collective bargaining, on labor market outcomes in 
developing countries is limited. Due to a lack of empirical evidence, the promotion of 
such rights remains controversial. Proponents argue that such rights prevent a ‘race to the 
bottom’ in the face of global integration, growing competitive pressures, and limited 
international cooperation in setting standards. Critics counter that such rights raise labor 
costs excessively and limit employment growth. Although both sides adopt strong 
positions, there is a good deal of uncertainty about the actual impact of such rights on 
wages and employment. 
 
This uncertainty arises, in large part, because of the difficulties in measuring labor 
rights at the country level and is compounded by limitations on comparable wage and 
employment data for many developing economies. In this report, we use existing data and 
indicators to examine the question: how do improvements in freedom of association and 
collective bargaining rights, in law and in practice, affect key labor market outcomes, 
such as real wages and employment? We are particularly interested in the impact of the 
rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining in low- and middle-income 
countries. However, by way of comparison, we also examine the impact of identical 
measurements of these rights in high-income countries. 
 
How much we can say about the relationship between labor rights and labor 
market outcomes depends on the data and indicators we have at our disposal. Therefore, 
much of the discussion focuses on methodological and measurement issues. Nevertheless, 
the paper is not purely methodological, but also conducts a concrete assessment of the 
impact of labor rights on labor market outcomes across countries. By doing so, we are 
better able to raise critical questions, identify constraints, and point out future research 
directions. Since human rights, including core labor rights, are meant to be implemented 
at the national level and extend to the entire population, our focus is on economy-wide 
effects. This differs from other, closely related, areas of research – such as those that 
examine the impact of unionization on individual earnings or enterprises. 
 
The report is organized as following. The next section reviews the literature on 
the measurement of the rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining and the 
impact of those rights on economic outcomes (e.g. trade or foreign direct investment). 
The review also examines closely related, but distinct, bodies of research, such as studies 
which document the impact of unionization on wages and employment. Following the 
literature review, we turn to the methodological challenges of measuring core labor rights 
and labor market outcomes, with a focus on developing countries. Labor rights do not 
apply equally to all types of employment and this poses analytical difficulties in countries 
with widespread self-employment and informal employment. The fourth section of the 
report outlines the research strategy we pursue in addressing the core research question 
and describes the data and indicators employed. We then present the results of the 
analysis and reflect on their implications. The report concludes with a cautionary 
discussion of the limitations and caveats associated with the analysis. In so doing, we 
point towards future areas of research. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
 One rationale for promoting freedom of association and collective bargaining 
rights is that such rights will affect labor market outcomes, such as earnings and 
employment, and thereby improve social welfare. These core rights allow employees to 
form unions and to bargain over employment conditions. Insofar as they strengthen 
bargaining capacity, such labor rights may lead to improvements in working conditions, 
including sustainable improvements in real wages. By affecting wages, and hence, labor 
costs, core labor standards may have subsequent impacts on other economic outcomes. 
The ‘labor cost channel’ is the primary conduit through which the rights of freedom and 
association and collective bargaining, as well as other labor standards, are expected to 
affect employment, investment, trade volume, and economic growth (Kucera, 2001; 
Rodrik 1996). 
 
 Despite the primacy given to wages in affecting other labor market outcomes, the 
impact of core labor standards on employment is not simple and unidirectional. 
Collective bargaining rights that lead to higher wages may also boost productivity 
(Martin and Maskus, 2001; Buchele and Christensen, 1995). The impact on labor costs is 
therefore ambiguous. Higher wages raise labor costs per worker, all things equal, but if 
average output per worker also grows, the cost per unit output could fall. If efficiency 
wage effects are present, higher wages can lead to greater job effort, lower turnover, and 
less conflictual industrial relationships – factors which lower production costs (Stiglitz, 
2000; Altenburg and Straub, 1998). Many factors other than direct costs determine labor 
demand. For example, if better labor standards lead to improved market access – e.g. 
through ‘fair trade’ initiatives or bilateral trade agreements – growth in output could 
compensate for any reduction in labor demand caused by higher wages (Heintz, 2003). 
Similarly, improved labor standards may correspond to other social improvements (e.g. 
increased transparency, stronger democratic institutions) which encourage, rather than 
discourage, investment (Kucera, 2001). 
 
It is also important to recognize that organized workers will take into account a 
variety of factors in their collective bargaining strategies. Arguments that organized labor 
only care about wage rates assume some level of irrationality or short-sightedness when 
trade-offs exist. Maintaining employment may be as important, if not more important, 
than wages since significant reductions in employment will undermine bargaining power 
over time. A more credible assumption is that workers take into account the current 
economic climate (e.g. is the economy entering a recession?), their own assessment of the 
risks of job loss (e.g. due to competitive pressures or falling demand), and constraints 
imposed by the domestic legal framework when formulating a collective bargaining 
strategy. In this case, the extension of collective bargaining rights would lead to better 
social outcomes when trade-offs exist, since they would improve the likelihood that 
workers could prioritize labor market outcomes based on what is most important to them. 
 
 There are not a large number of empirical studies that specifically document the 
impact of core labor standards, specifically freedom of association and collective 
bargaining rights, on wages and employment. Instead, studies tend to focus on the 
relationship between wages and unionization (the union wage premium) and the 
relationship between wages and specific outcomes (investment, employment, FDI, and 
trade). However, unionization and higher wages are only potential outcomes of 
strengthening core labor standards, specifically the freedom of association and collective 
bargaining rights. These outcomes may not materialize in reality. A country could have 
high rates of reported unionization and circumscribed labor rights, particularly in 
countries where independent unions face repression.  Guaranteeing the right to organize 
does not mean that organizing efforts will be successful. In addition, as pointed out 
above, basic labor rights and wages can affect other variables which influence 
employment and investment. 
 
 Kucera (2001) specifically examines the impact of freedom of association and 
collective bargaining rights on manufacturing wages and the manufacturing wage share 
in cross-country regressions. He develops an index of labor rights, focused on freedom 
and association and collective bargaining and based on 37 indicators (the methodology by 
which the index was constructed is discussed at greater length later in this report). He 
finds that better labor rights are positively associated with wages in manufacturing, but 
the results are generally not statistically significant if the sample is limited to developing 
countries. 
 
 Rama (2003) finds that the number of ILO conventions ratified and a set of 
collective bargaining indicators (unionization rates, coverage of collective bargaining 
agreements, and strike activity) have a negative impact on inequality – i.e. better labor 
rights are associated with a more equal distribution of income and/or consumption. Since 
low-income households tend to rely on employment earnings for most of their income, 
this could indicate that labor standards have a positive impact on total employment 
income, although such a conclusion is speculative since the dependent variable is total 
income/consumption inequality (not earnings inequality). When Rama controls for 
country-specific characteristics, he finds that only the number of ILO conventions ratified 
and the percentage of the salaried workforce covered by collective bargaining agreements 
still have statistically significant moderating influences on inequality. It is worth noting 
that the coverage of collective bargaining agreements only has a statistically significant 
impact on income/consumption shares for certain quintiles of the overall income 
distribution. 
 
 Rodrik (1996) examines the impact of the number of ILO conventions ratified, an 
index of civil liberties, and child labor practices on (a) manufacturing wages (measured in 
U.S. dollars, but controlling for productivity differentials), (b) the ratio of garments and 
textiles in total exports (which he argues is an indicator of comparative advantage in 
labor intensive sectors), and (c) foreign direct investment. He finds that ratification of 
ILO conventions and the civil liberties index has a positive impact on manufacturing 
wages, while child labor practices tend to be associated with lower average wages. 
Despite these impacts on manufacturing wages, he does not find significant negative 
impacts of the ILO conventions variable or the civil liberties index on foreign direct 
investment or the garment/textile share of total exports. Kucera (2001) similarly finds 
that his index of freedom of association and collective bargaining has no negative impact 
on foreign direct investment. Teitelbaum (2010) replicates Kucera’s study using a 
modified index of freedom of association and collective bargaining rights and also finds 
no impact on foreign direct investment. 
 
A World Bank publication examined the relationship between the presence of 
trade unions and broad indicators of economic performance by reviewing an impressive 
number of studies on the topic (Aidt and Tzannatos, 2002). The authors conclude that 
countries with stronger collective bargaining systems had lower unemployment on 
average, along with greater economic stability. In addition, countries with higher union 
density tended to have lower inflation and were able to recover more quickly from 
recessions. 
 
For developing countries – most of which can be characterized as relatively small, 
open economies – the impact of labor standards on trade performance is of particular 
concern. Specifically, some argue that labor standards compromise the competitive 
position of those developing countries with an abundance of low-skill, low-wage labor 
(Bhagwati 1995, Corden and Vousden 2001). This loss of competitive advantage means 
fewer jobs and scarcer economic opportunities for low-paid workers with few skills. 
However, there are two sides to this relationship. Others take the position that growing 
global integration creates perverse incentives whereby the deterioration of basic standards 
is rewarded by increased competitiveness. In the absence of international cooperation, 
individual countries cannot raise labor standards without jeopardizing their competitive 
advantage. All countries are made worse off because they adopt lower standards than 
would be socially desirable. Under these conditions, international cooperation in the form 
of global standards could produce a better outcome (Sengenberger 1994). 
 
The empirical evidence suggests that core labor standards do not have a 
significant impact on international trade. That is, in terms of basic labor rights, there is 
neither a significant sacrifice of employment opportunities nor a clear race to the bottom. 
For example, Kucera and Sarni (2004), in a series of cross-country regressions, find a 
positive relationship between stronger rights and higher manufacturing exports, although 
they note that their results say nothing about causality. In addition, this positive 
relationship does not consistently hold for labor-intensive exports, and appears to depend 
on how such exports are classified. In a meta-analysis of studies examining the links 
between labor standards and trade volume, Brown (2000) finds little evidence of a 
connection. Similarly, Dehejia and Samy (2004) uncover no relationship between labor 
standards and comparative advantage. These research findings do not imply that labor 
costs are unimportant in trade dynamics – simply that there appears to be little evidence 
that core labor standards in themselves negatively impact trade outcomes – including 
basic rights such as freedom of association. 
 
 There is a substantial literature on the impact of unionization on wages, compared 
to research on the impacts of freedom of association and collective bargaining on labor 
market outcomes. It is worth reviewing these findings, since there is a close relationship 
between unionization and the rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining – 
although the relationship is far from perfect. 
 
There is large body of evidence showing that unionization in industrialized 
countries increases wages, although the union wage premium varies significantly across 
industries, occupations, public and private sectors, age cohorts, regions, and countries 
(e.g. Lewis, 1963; Freeman and Medoff, 1984; Blanchflower and Freeman, 1992; 
Freeman, 1994; Blanchflower and Bryson, 2003; Hara and Kawaguchi, 2008). Estimates 
of the aggregate union wage premium in the U.S. typically range from 12 percent to 25 
percent (Gittleman and Pierce, 2006; Hirsch, 2004; Blanchflower and Bryson, 2003). A 
union premium of 15 percent has often been used as a ‘rule of thumb.’  
 
In the U.S., there is evidence that the private sector union wage premium has been 
declining (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2003; Bratsberg and Ragan, 2002). This trend is 
consistent with the drop in unionization rates which has occurred – we would expect 
weaker unions to have a more difficult time sustaining a wage premium. In addition, the 
wage premium appears to be counter-cyclical – unionized workers are better able to 
sustain their wages during a downturn than are non-unionized workers (Blanchflower and 
Bryson, 2003; Freeman and Medoff, 1984). There is also evidence that unions compress 
the wage distribution in the U.S. and other high-income countries – i.e. they reduce 
earnings inequalities by raising wages of low-paid workers more than high-paid workers 
(Gittleman and Pierce, 2006; Bratsberg and Ragan, 2002; Freeman, 1994). This is 
consistent with the observation Rama (2005) made that core labor standards and 
collective bargaining rights may reduce income inequalities. 
 
The literature on union wage premiums is overwhelmingly focused on high-
income, developed economies. Studies on union wage premiums for low-income and 
middle-income countries are far less common. Rama (2005) suggests that union wage 
premiums are significantly smaller for developing countries than for high-income 
countries, although exceptions exist. Rama states “… estimated wage premiums range 
from negligible in Senegal to small in Mexico” (p. 173).1  
                                                 
1    Aidt and Tzannatos (2002), in their World Bank study, report union wage premiums for developing 
countries that are significantly higher than premiums in industrialized countries – a finding that contradicts 
the discussion in Rama (2005). However, the studies surveyed by Toke and Tzannatos (2002) are older. 
Improvements to data make it possible to control for factors which raise wages and might be attributed to 
unions if left out of the analysis. For example, Blunch and Verner (2004) find that it is important to control 
for enterprise size in order to estimate the union wage premium and they find a significantly lower 
 
A significant union wage premium has been documented for South Africa. 
Butcher and Rouse (2001) estimated that the wage premium was 10-13 percent for white 
workers and approximately 20 percent for black workers – comparable to the wage 
premiums estimated for the U.S. However, in other African countries for which estimates 
are available, the wage premium appears to be smaller.2 Blunch and Verner (2004) 
examine union wage premiums in Ghana and find evidence of such premiums only for 
the bottom 10 percent of the wage distribution – and no evidence of an aggregate wage 
premium. These findings support the idea that unions in developing countries may act to 
reduce wage inequalities. Arbache (1999) estimates the union wage premium for 
Brazilian manufacturing at 4-6 percent – significantly lower than most estimates for 
developed economies. Interestingly, Arbache suggests that unions may contribute to 
wage inequality in Brazilian manufacturing, contrary to the findings in other countries 
that unionization tends to reduce earnings inequality. In contrast, Fairris (2003) finds that 
unions reduce earnings inequality in Mexico, although this effect has weakened over 
time. Park (1991) estimates a union wage premium in Korean manufacturing of 4.2 
percent, although the analysis is restricted to male workers. Fields and Yoo (2000) 
estimate a Korean union wage premium (in 1993) of 5.8 percent.  
 
Studies of the impact of unions on employment are much less common than 
studies of the impact of unions on wages. Most empirical studies of labor demand find a 
negative relationship between employment and wages, controlling for other factors which 
may influence labor demand (Hamermesh, 1993). However, this does not imply that 
unions will necessarily have a negative impact on employment, since unionization may 
affect a number of variables other than the average wage rate – productivity, turnover, 
skill levels, etc. At the macroeconomic level, higher average wages help support 
aggregate demand and employment, even though there may be a trade-off between 
employment and wages at a microeconomic level, controlling for the level of demand in 
the economy. 
 
Empirical research on the relationship between unionization and employment is 
mixed (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2003). Some studies of high-income countries show a 
significant negative relationship between unions and plant-level employment growth 
(Leonard, 1992). Others suggest that unionization may contribute to plant closure 
(Bryson, 2001). In contrast, DiNardo and Lee (2004) found that unionization has no 
statistically significant impact on firm survival and, at most, a small impact on jobs.3 
Studies outside of the U.S. and Western Europe also yield mixed results. Kim (2005) uses 
macroeconomic data from Korea to argue that there is a long-run equilibrium relationship 
between unionization and unemployment, in which more unionization leads to greater 
unemployment, albeit over a period of time in which the economy and formal 
                                                                                                                                                 
premium for Ghana than that reported in Aidt and Tzannatos (2002). Freeman (2009) also surveys the 
literature on union wage premiums in developing countries. 
2    Freeman (2009) cites some studies which find a negative union wage premium in some African 
countries, but this is likely because unions in these countries do not engage in standard collective 
bargaining activities. 
3    DiNardo and Lee’s finding stem, in part, from their observation that new unionization in the U.S. has 
had a relatively small impact on wages at the firm level. 
employment were growing at extremely rapid rates and, apart from the 1997 East Asian 
Crisis, unemployment was generally very low.4 In contrast, using enterprise-level data 
from Brazil, Menezes-Filho, et al. (2008) find that unionization has a positive impact on 
employment, although these impacts decrease with the level of unionization.  
 
 Clearly, the literature on the impact of unions, unionization, and union density is 
much richer than the literature on the economic impacts of collective bargaining and 
freedom of association – particularly for high-income, industrialized countries. However, 
it is important to bear in mind that these core labor rights are distinct from the number of 
unions or the rate of unionization. Therefore, while the studies of the economic and labor 
market impacts of unionization are informative, they cannot be taken to necessarily 
reflect the effects of the rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining. This is 
partly because unions can exist without strong labor rights and labor rights can be in 
place without strong unions. Moreover, labor rights represent basic human rights that 
should apply to a country as a whole. While unionization may only exist in certain 
industries or occupations, freedom of association and collective bargaining rights are 
more broadly applicable. Certainly, enforcement of these rights varies from sector to 
sector (and we would expect that the ability to exercise these rights would be closely 
correlated with the rate of unionization). Nevertheless, core labor standards should be 
thought of as distinct from unionization. 
 
Although the focus of this paper is on the core labor rights to freedom of 
association and collective bargaining, it is useful to consider other labor market 
interventions which attempt to improve the welfare of employees. The rights to freedom 
of association and collective bargaining represent labor standards which concern the 
processes by which wages and working conditions are determined. However, the ability 
to translate these rights into concrete labor market outcomes depends on the relative 
bargaining power of labor. The term ‘labor standards’ often encompasses a wide variety 
of rights and regulations – those that guarantee a specific labor market outcome (e.g. 
minimum wages) may have a bigger impact on costs than others (e.g. those guaranteeing 
a right to collective bargaining), depending on the ability of workers to take advantage of 
new rights. Therefore, it is useful to briefly consider the economic impact of standards 
which aim to guarantee a minimum outcome – i.e. the literature on minimum wage laws. 
 
Critics of minimum wage policies argue that such policies create distortions 
which destroy jobs. However, the empirical evidence of a sizable trade-off between 
employment and minimum wages is not strong. In the U.S., Card and Krueger (1995) 
exploited a “natural experiment” to examine the impact of a higher state minimum wage 
in New Jersey. Theory would suggest that employers of low-wage workforces would 
reduce employment or raise prices significantly. Card and Krueger compared fast food 
restaurants along the New Jersey-Pennsylvania border and found that the New Jersey 
employers did not reduce employment or raise prices significantly. Other scholars have 
examined the impact of U.S. living wage ordinances which mandate higher wage rates 
for certain employees, usually at the municipal level. To date, the majority of living wage 
                                                 
4    Kim (2005) shows that the unemployment rate in Korea generally ranged between 2 and 5 percent from 
1970 to 2002, except in 1998 and 1999 when it approached 7 percent. 
impact studies find little or no evidence of reduced employment (Pollin, Brenner, Wicks-
Lim and Luce 2008). 
 
 Studies in developing countries have found that minimum wages have a positive 
impact on poverty reduction (Saget, 2001; Lustig and McLeod 1997). While these latter 
studies do not examine employment effects directly, they do indicate that minimum 
wages have a net positive impact on the incomes of poor households. Therefore, in terms 
of economic inequalities, research into the impacts of minimum wage policies reaches 
similar general conclusions to studies on the impact of unionization: they tend to reduce 
poverty or income inequality. However, it is important to bear in mind that, in many 
developing countries, widespread informality and high levels of self-employment mean 
that minimum wages laws do not apply, either de jure or de facto, to many workers. 
Enforcement is often problematic (Rama, 2005). Therefore, not all of the ‘working poor’ 
benefit equally from minimum wage legislation. 
 
3. Framework and Methodological Issues 
 
3.1 Conceptual Framework for the Research 
 
 In this report, we explore the impact of two core labor standards – the right of 
freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining – on wage and employment 
outcomes at the country level, with a specific focus on developing countries. We focus on 
country-level impacts, since core labor standards are typically adopted at the national 
level and issues around enforcement and de facto realization of labor rights have been 
measured at the country level.5 This does not imply that research could not be conducted 
at the level of the firm or the workplace. However, lack of credible data at this level of 
disaggregation precludes undertaking a serious quantitative assessment at the enterprise 
level or among employers.6 Therefore, the approach adopted here is a cross-country 
analysis of the impact of freedom of association and collective bargaining rights on wage 
and employment growth. 
 
 We expect that the extension of the rights to freedom and association and 
collective bargaining would impact wage outcomes since such rights allow workers some 
degree of influence over labor market outcomes, depending on their organizational 
strength, bargaining power, and other institutional and economic factors. Furthermore, as 
discussed in the literature review, we would expect organized workers to bargain over 
more than just wages – including the level of employment, benefits, and other aspects of 
the employment arrangement. Higher wages may adversely impact employment by 
bidding up labor costs and reducing labor demand. However, as discussed earlier, labor 
rights may also improve productivity, foster better industrial relations, reduce turnover, 
and contribute to dynamic efficiencies through skills acquisition. The impact of labor 
                                                 
5    Regional variations may exist within a particular country – in the U.S., collective bargaining rights vary 
by state. We do not focus on these sub-national differences here. 
6    As evident from the literature review, firm level studies of unionization have been undertaken. 
However, it is much easier to measure unionization at the firm level using survey data than it is to measure 
basic labor rights such as freedom of association and collective bargaining. 
rights on employment is ambiguous – even if collective bargaining does result in higher 
real wages. 
 
 Legislation protecting freedom of association and collective bargaining does not, 
in itself, guarantee that such rights will be realized on the ground. Workers may be 
unaware that such rights exist and may not know how to exercise their rights. 
Enforcement may be uneven or non-existent. This creates a gap between de jure and de 
facto enjoyment of basic labor rights. To the extent possible, given the indicators which 
exist, we attempt to take into account these distinctions – the legal framework governing 
freedom of association and collective bargaining and evidence as to the realization of 
these rights (including impediments to realizing them), even when legal protections exist. 
We discuss the methodological challenges of doing this in the next section of this paper. 
 
 An additional challenge in assessing the impact of core labor rights on labor 
market outcomes is the problem of causality. Improvements in freedom of association 
and collective bargaining may improve wages. However, factors which raise wages (e.g. 
economic growth) may also lead to improvements in labor rights. Given data limitations, 
it is hard to rigorously address these endogeneity problems through estimation 
techniques, such as instrumental variable analysis (i.e. it is extremely difficult to find a 
variable for which data is readily available which is correlated with labor rights but 
uncorrelated with wages or employment). Therefore, we focus on the impact of labor 
rights indicators at a particular moment in time on subsequent wage and employment 
growth. It is hard to argue that subsequent wage or employment growth would have 
impacted initial labor market institutions. In addition, we focus on growth of wages and 
employment in order to reduce the possibility that other country-specific factors, 
correlated with labor standards, determine the level of wages or employment. 
 
 In many respects, the impact of freedom of association and collective bargaining 
rights on employment and wages is an empirical question – it cannot be resolved by 
appealing to economic theory alone. The exercises presented later in this paper represent 
a concrete exploration of these issues based on existing data. However, because of data 
limitations, they are not meant to be definitive. In exploring these questions, we hope to 
provide insights into the methodological issues involved in conducting research along 
these lines. 
 
3.2 Methodological and measurement issues 
 
3.2.1 Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining Rights 
 
 To evaluate the impact of freedom of association and collective bargaining rights 
on labor market outcomes using a cross-country analysis requires indicators of the 
existence of these rights and, ideally, the extent to which they are actually realized on the 
ground. However, developing reliable indicators of core labor rights – particularly 
freedom of association and collective bargaining rights – is challenging. For example, 
information sources are often incomplete (or not strictly comparable), certain indicators 
take on different meanings from one country setting to the next, and the distinction 
between rights codified under law (de jure) and rights enjoyed in practice (de facto) is 
difficult to capture (Kucera, 2007; Teitelbaum, 2010). 
 
 Economists have sometimes used the number of ILO conventions which a country 
has ratified as an indicator of support for core labor rights (see Rodrik, 1996 and Rama, 
2005 for examples). In terms of core labor rights, the ILO’s eight fundamental 
conventions are frequently emphasized. The fundamental conventions fall under four 
broad headings: forced labor, discrimination, child labor, and freedom of association 
(including collective bargaining rights). The use of the number of fundamental 
conventions ratified has one practical advantage for cross-country studies: this indicator 
is readily available for a large number of countries. However, there are significant 
drawbacks. Ratification of an ILO convention has different implications for national 
labor laws in different countries. Ratification by no means implies that core labor rights 
are actually realized on the ground. Changes over time, apart from additional 
ratifications, are not captured. Once a convention is ratified, it generally remains ratified, 
although the actual environment with regard to civil and economic rights subsequently 
changes over time in ways that are not captured by simply counting ratifications.7    
 
 Some analysts have included indices of civil and political rights – such as the 
index produced by Freedom House – as an indicator.8 The argument is that countries with 
stronger civil and political rights will also encourage the realization of basic labor rights. 
The Freedom House Index measures political and civil rights separately. Political rights 
are measured in three categories: electoral process, political pluralism and participation, 
and functioning of government. Civil rights are measured in four categories: freedom of 
expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal 
autonomy and individual rights. Within the category ‘associational and organizational 
rights’ there is a question pertaining to freedom of association and collective bargaining 
rights.  
 
While the rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining are included 
in the Freedom House index, many other variables determine the overall rating. This 
raises questions as to which component of the index influences particular outcomes. For 
example, investors may respond positively to certain institutions that increase a country’s 
ranking, such as secure property rights, while other aspects of civil and political rights 
included in the index, such as enhanced democratic accountability, may not always be in 
investors’ best interest (Li and Resnick, 2003). A similar logic applies to core labor rights 
– a higher Freedom House ranking may encourage investment or employment growth for 
reasons other than improvements in labor rights. In addition, the Freedom House Index is 
constructed using expert assessments – with the experts being either Freedom House 
Staff or consultants hired for this purpose. One study finds that these expert assessments 
are subject to errors and that these deviations are correlated with extraneous 
characteristics of the countries being rated – i.e. the errors are non-random (Bollen and 
                                                 
7    In rare cases, a ratified convention will be subsequently denounced. However, such reversals have 
happened in only two countries: Malaysia and Singapore. 
8    Information on the 2010 Freedom House Index can be found at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/.   
Paxton, 2000). This has lead some to argue that such assessments are biased and reflect 
subjective opinions and perceptions unrelated to de facto enjoyment of civil liberties. 
 
 Another indicator which is used to capture labor rights, specifically freedom of 
association and collective bargaining, is the rate of unionization or union density. The 
argument here is that the rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining are 
meant to facilitate collective action on the part of working people. The extent of 
unionization is one outcome that could be linked to an enhanced capacity for collective 
action. However, as discussed earlier in the literature review, unionization rates may be 
imperfect measures of core labor rights, particularly in cases where independent unions 
do not exist or face harassment.  
 
 Kucera (2001, 2007) adopts the innovative approach of coding violations of labor 
rights to create a more nuanced measure of freedom of association and collective 
bargaining that takes into account both de jure and de facto aspects of the realization of 
these rights. Detailed discussion of this methodology can be found in Kucera (2007). 
Here we provide a brief summary. Kucera uses textual sources to document violations of 
trade union rights across 37 evaluation criteria. The focus is on violations of basic rights 
– good practices and exemplary conduct is not explicitly considered. The three textual 
sources are: (1) the Annual Survey of the Violation of Trade Union Rights of the 
International Trade Union Congress (ITUC)/International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU)9; the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices from the U.S. State 
Department; and the ILO’s Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association. To the 
extent possible, given the incomplete nature of the information available, violations of 
rights were coded for each of the 37 criteria and a composite index was then computed. 
Explicit coding rules were developed to minimize any bias introduced by subjective 
judgments on the part of the evaluator.  
 
 Examples of the 37 evaluation criteria include: the right to freely elect union 
representatives, general prohibitions on collective bargaining, the right to join unions, 
dissolution or suspension of unions, interference from employers, and exclusion of 
workers in particular sectors from freedom of association or collective bargaining. A full 
listing of the criteria used can be found in Kucera (2007). Two versions of the aggregate 
index were calculated: a weighted index and an unweighted index. The unweighted index  
treats all criteria equally. The weighted index assigns a weight to each criteria that aims 
to capture the severity of the violation. In Kucera’s subsequent analysis, both weighted 
and unweighted indices are used in order to test the robustness of the methodology to 
assumptions about the relative severity of violations. 
 
 In terms of the limitations of the index, Kucera (2007) identifies information 
problems as the most significant weakness. Information on violations of trade union 
rights is not consistently available for all countries. Moreover, different regions of the 
                                                 
9    In 2006, the affiliates of the ICFTU were re-organized into the ITUC, along with the affiliates of the 
World Confederation of Labor (WCL) and other unions which had no previous international affiliation. The 
Annual Survey of the Violation of Trade Union Rights is now compiled by the ITUC. With the formation of 
the ITUC, the ICFTU was dissolved. 
world tend to report violations with greater frequency which could lead to regional biases 
with important implications for cross-country work. In addition, Kucera raises some 
concern that the index may not consistently track changes over time, since there is some 
unevenness is reporting from year to year and the quality of information appears to 
evolve over time.10 Finally, it is hard to interpret what it means for a country to report a 
violation relative to non-reporting by another country. Non-reporting does not necessarily 
indicate that problems do not exist. 
 
 This raises one important weakness of using reported violations to measure labor 
rights. Countries with strong labor movements may be more likely to report violations 
than countries in which unions or workers face repression. Teitelbaum (2010) suggests 
that countries with limited union activity – due to lack of industrial development or 
government violations of human rights – may receive better scores when the index is 
constructed using textual sources of labor rights violations. He further notes that this can 
create problematic comparisons between OECD countries and non-OECD developing 
countries. In addition, although general prohibitions on union activity are included in the 
index, such general prohibitions have significant implications for the measurement of 
other elements of the index. As Teitelbaum writes, “countries that enforce general 
prohibitions on all union activity will not experience violations of FACB [freedom of 
association and collective bargaining] rights because FACB rights are an irrelevant 
concept where unions cannot organize to exercise those rights” (p. 466). Re-coding 
elements of the index may improve the measurement of freedom of association and 
collective bargaining rights, but it does not resolve the conundrum of whether a general 
prohibition on union activity makes the concept of these labor rights meaningless.   
 
 Given the range of pros and cons associated with using any one of these 
approaches, in this report we employ a variety of existing indicators to examine whether 
there is any relationship between labor rights and labor market outcomes in terms of 
wages and employment. In doing so, we explore whether different indicators yield 
different results. Before turning to this analysis, we first discuss some methodological 
issues pertaining to the measurement of employment and wages. 
 
3.2.2 Measuring employment and employment trends 
 
 Using international definitions, employment is often measured as work in any 
activity that would contribute to a country’s national product as measured by the system 
of national accounts (SNA). This includes, but is not restricted to, working for others as 
an employee, various forms of self-employment, unpaid work on a family enterprise, and 
household production of goods for own-use. In high-income, industrialized countries, we 
tend to assume that employment corresponds to paid work as an employee, since this 
remains the dominant form of employment. However, in developing countries, forms of 
self-employment may be as important if not more important than paid employees. In 
addition, a large share, often a majority of all employment is informal – i.e. not covered 
by basic social or legal protections (ILO, 2002; Chen et al., 2005).  
                                                 
10    Kucera’s (2001, 2007) index is not constructed as a time series. It uses information from 1993 to 1997, 
centered on the year 1995. 
 
 These distinctions are important to take into account when analyzing the impact 
of labor rights on employment. Rights to freedom of association and collective 
bargaining, as discussed in this paper, tend to be restricted to formal paid employees. 
Self-employed workers may form associations and, in some cases, may bargain 
collectively (albeit with suppliers, intermediaries, or municipal authorities). However, the 
rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining, as typically enshrined in law, 
generally only apply to workers in an employer-employee relationship. Informal paid 
employees, by definition, do not enjoy these rights, even if the legal protections exist. In 
this case, there is gap between de jure and de facto realization of rights – a gap which is 
often missed in the kinds of indicators discussed in the previous section. 
 
 These complexities need to be taken into account when we pose questions like: 
what is the impact of freedom of association and collective bargaining on employment 
outcomes? The impact may be quite different depending on the type of employment 
under consideration. As discussed in the literature review, labor rights are generally 
assumed to affect employment by changing labor costs. We have already pointed out that 
this simple line of reasoning may not hold when core labor rights affect productivity, 
labor relations, or other factors of importance. Nevertheless, even taken at its face value, 
labor rights will directly affect employment through the labor cost channel only when 
those rights actually apply to the specific employment arrangement in question. We 
would not expect the same direct impact on self-employment or forms of informal 
employment. 
 
 In fact, the impact of better labor standards on informal employment and atypical 
forms of employment may be positive, depending on the response of employers to 
stronger rights. Standard dualist models of informal employment argue that factors which 
raise wages above a market-clearing level, including collective bargaining institutions, 
will lead to rationing of formal job opportunities. Those that cannot work in the formal 
economy are absorbed into informal employment, where social and regulatory 
protections do not apply (Fields, 1975). As we have discussed in the literature review, the 
evidence that labor rights negatively affect employment outcomes in this way is weak. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that labor rights have an impact on formal employment, the 
result may be a shift from formal to informal employment, leaving total employment 
relatively unaffected. Perhaps more common are employer responses that try to evade 
labor regulations. For example, employer strategies to hire workers as independent 
contractors rather than paid employees affect workers’ access to legal protections (e.g. 
Carré, 2004). The composition of employment affects the degree to which the rights to 
freedom of association and collective bargaining apply to the employed workforce. 
 
 Shifts in employment from formal to informal forms (or from standard to atypical 
forms) may not affect total employment numbers and, therefore, leave labor market 
indicators like the unemployment rate largely unchanged. However, underemployment is 
commonplace in most forms of informal employment. Similarly, a shift from full-time to 
part-time work represents a reduction in total labor demand, even through the aggregate 
employment numbers may remain constant. 
 
 If we are concerned about the impact of labor rights on employment in developing 
countries, it does not necessarily make sense to examine trends in aggregate employment. 
Instead, as an initial step, we would want to focus on how core rights are associated with 
changes in particular categories of employment. One possibility would be to begin with 
formal and informal employment, distinguishing between paid employees and self-
employed workers. However, detailed, and consistent, statistics on formal and informal 
employment over time are generally not available for a large number of countries, 
although better data is becoming available.  
 
For the purposes of the preliminary analysis presented in this paper, we chose to 
focus on the impact of labor standards on changes in manufacturing employment. There 
are several reasons for this choice. First, data on manufacturing employment over time is 
available for a large number of countries. Second, outside of the public sector and 
agriculture, collective bargaining has been concentrated in industrial sectors 
(manufacturing, mining, etc.). Third, manufacturing sectors represent tradable sectors 
whose output is either exported or subject to competition from imports. We would expect 
employment in tradable sectors to be particularly sensitive to changes in labor costs.  
 
Given these considerations, we expect the response of manufacturing employment 
to be particularly sensitive to freedom of association and collective bargaining dynamics 
– to the extent that such a relationship exists. Therefore, examining the relationship 
between labor market outcomes in manufacturing and core labor standards provides one 
indication of the broader impact on wages and employment.   
 
3.2.3 Measuring wages and wage trends 
 
 Measuring trends in real wages presents many of the same challenges as 
measuring trends in employment. Income from employment may be in the form of wages 
paid to employees, but it also may represent gross income from self-employment. Some 
forms of employment (e.g. workers on family enterprises) may receive no individual 
payments, although the family enterprise generates income for the household. When we 
speak of collective bargaining over wages, we generally are referring to paid employment 
in formal firms. However, as already pointed out, these jobs may constitute a minority of 
total employment in developing countries. 
 
 For the reasons discussed above, we restrict our attention to the wages of paid 
employees in the manufacturing sector. Furthermore, we focus on average wages for all 
paid employees. That is, we do not differentiate by occupation. As discussed in the 
literature review, the union wage premium varies along a number of dimensions, one of 
which is occupation. Therefore, we expect the rights to freedom of association and 
collective bargaining to affect workers differently across occupations. Professional and 
managerial workers will have different wage dynamics than production workers. In 
addition, the literature review showed that one impact that unions have had in many 
countries is to compress the wage distribution – i.e. reduce earnings inequality. Again – 
this suggests that core labor rights will affect groups of workers differently.  
 
In the analysis which follows, we put these complications aside. The reasons for 
doing so are practical. We are interested in examining how freedom of association and 
collective bargaining rights affect changes in employment and wages over time. In 
addition, our research strategy involves examining these relationships across countries. 
The availability of comparable time series data on wages and employment, particularly 
for developing countries, is limited. Therefore, we aim to keep the analysis simple and 
focused. In the future, as indicators and sources of information improve, researchers will 
be able to explore more complex questions. 
 
3.2.4 Methodological issues: policy correlations 
 
 Changes in labor rights are frequently associated with other policy changes which 
impact employment and wages. For example, bilateral free trade agreements – such as 
those between the U.S. and a developing county – may contain provisions aimed at 
improving core labor rights. This could cause a country to improve labor standards at the 
same time that they gain better access to external markets. In situations like this, it may 
be difficult to isolate the impact of labor standards on from other policy changes. 
Similarly, changes to labor regulations may be included as part of a country’s broader 
development strategy.  If policies are jointly implemented, it would be misleading to 
attribute observed changes in employment and earnings to labor reforms alone without 
taking into account the effect stemming from other policy changes. Evaluating labor 
standards within the context of trade agreements and development policy is beyond the 
scope of this paper. However, these issues should be kept in mind when interpreting the 
findings of this report. 
 
4. Data and analytical strategy 
 
4.1 The impact of freedom of association and collective bargaining rights on employment 
and wages: core variables and indicators 
 
 This paper presents some preliminary analysis of the relationship between the 
rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining on employment and wage 
outcomes. As discussed above, we focus on the impact on manufacturing wages and 
employment. Data on manufacturing wages, employment, and output were taken from the 
UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization) database: INDSTAT2 
2009, Rev. 3. Data on hours of work are not available, so wages are measured as average 
wages paid per worker. Wages and output are expressed in national currency units and 
adjusted for domestic inflation using each country’s GDP price deflator. Price deflators 
were taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database. We used 
national currencies and domestic deflators to avoid problems associated with exchange 
rate volatility and global purchasing power parity indicators. This is only an issue 
because the real wage and output variables will be expressed in different units for 
different countries. However, our analysis focuses on the unit-less measure of real wage 
and real output growth, so the use of national currency units is not a constraint. 
 
 We examine four indicators of freedom of association and collective bargaining 
rights: 
 
• Kucera’s index of freedom of association and collective bargaining rights (based 
on reported violations from textual sources)11 
• The Freedom House index of civil liberties (based on expert assessment, but not 
restricted to labor rights) 
• Union membership as a percent of the labor force12 
• Number of fundamental ILO conventions ratified (as reported by the ILO) 
 
As has been mentioned, our analysis involves examining the degree to which the 
rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining at a given moment in time 
affect subsequent labor market outcomes in terms of employment and wages. Kucera’s 
index is constructed using data from the mid-1990s, centering the estimates to the best 
extent possible on the year 1995. To keep the analysis comparable across other 
indicators, we also focus on the values of those indicators in the mid-1990s. For the 
Freedom House index of civil liberties, we follow Kucera in using the annual average of 
this index from 1993 to 1997. In the database we used, union density rates were available 
as five-year averages. We used the average for the period 1990-94 unless there were no 
observations for a particular country during this period, in which case the average from 
1995-1999 was used. Finally, we used the number of ILO fundamental conventions 
ratified in 1995. Convention 182 (on the Worst Forms of Child Labor) was only adopted 
by the ILO in 1999, so we did not include it as one of the eight fundamental conventions, 
since no country could have ratified it in 1995.13  
 
 The general empirical model which we estimate is of the general form: 
 
i
facb
ii xrw γβα ++=  …or …  ifacbii xre γβα ++=  
 
In which ‘w’ represents average real wage growth from 1996 to 2006, ‘e’ average 
employment growth from 1996 to 2006, ‘rfacb’ the relevant indicator of freedom of 
association and collective bargaining rights (circa 1995), and ‘x ‘the average growth rate 
                                                 
11    David Kucera provided the data for the indices he constructed and used in his 2001 paper. We thank 
him for this assistance. In the analysis which follows, we use the weighted version of Kucera’s index. The 
unweighted version yields similar results, but occasionally with a lower level of statistical significance. 
12     Union density rates for OECD countries are readily available, but equivalent indicators for many 
developing countries are harder to come by. Martín Rama provided estimates of union membership as a 
percent of the labor force. He had assembled a set of labor market indicators with Raquel Artecona in a 
2002 World Bank report “A Database of Labor Market Indicators Across Countries”. These indicators 
included unionization rates for both developed and developing countries, expressed as averages over 5 year 
periods. Unionization rates were only calculated for countries with available data. We thank Martín Rama 
for making these indicators available. 
13    The other 7 fundamental conventions include: No. 29 Forced Labor Convention, No. 87 Freedom of 
Association and the Right to Organize, No. 98 Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining, No. 100 Equal 
Remuneration Convention, No. 105 Abolition of Forced Labor, No. 111 Discrimination Convention, and 
No. 138 Minimum Age Convention. 
of real output from 1996 to 2006.14 Estimates were generated using standard cross-
country regressions. 
 
Our analytical exercise involves assessing whether the rights to freedom of 
association and collective bargaining, in the mid-1990s, impacted manufacturing 
employment or wage growth from 1996 to 2006 for a given growth rate in output. Wages 
and employment tend to rise with faster growth. However, many factors other than labor 
rights effect the growth of output. Simply correlating the level of labor rights with 
subsequent employment or wage growth could lead to misleading conclusions (if, for 
example, growth happened to be faster in countries with weaker rights due to factors 
other than the labor rights in question). Therefore, we control for the growth of output 
when assessing the impact of the rights to freedom of association and collective 
bargaining. 
 
Some studies within the broad literature on union wage premiums and labor rights 
suggest that the relationship between unionization and/or labor rights may be non-linear.  
For example, in the literature review we discussed a Brazilian study by Menezes-Filho, et 
al. (2008) that finds that unionization has a positive impact on employment, although 
these impacts decrease with the level of unionization. The nature of collective bargaining 
may also change with the level of unionization. For example, high rates of unionization 
may be associated with more centralized bargaining, while lower or mid-range rates of 
unionization may be associated with firm- or employer-level bargaining. These 
institutional changes also introduce non-linearities into the relationship. To allow for non-
linearities with regard to freedom of association and collective bargaining rights, we 
introduce a squared value of the indicator in some of the regressions presented later in 
this report. 
 
4.2. Principal components analysis 
 
 The four indicators of freedom of association and collective bargaining rights are 
not perfect. Each has its limitations. These methodological issues were discussed in 
previous sections of the report. We do not expect any single indicator to fully capture the 
underlying labor rights of interest. Some indicators may perform better than others in 
regression analysis and some may have more severe drawbacks, but no single one of 
them is completely satisfying. However, each indicator provides us with an incomplete 
glimpse into some aspect of the rights of freedom of association and collective 
bargaining. 
 
 Given this situation, we use the four indicators to construct a composite index of 
the underlying rights. Imagine that an unobserved variable exists which accurately 
                                                 
14    A ten year period was chosen for two reasons. First, we expect the impact of institutional changes – 
such as better labor rights – to be long-run, rather than short-run, in nature. Ideally, we would trace these 
dynamics over time, but the lack of time series data prevents us from doing so. Second, real wages and 
employment, particularly in developing countries, can be highly volatile (e.g. due to exchange rate swings, 
sudden price increases, and exogenous supply- and demand-shocks). Averaging over significantly long 
period of time helps to smooth out this ‘noise’. The downside is that it becomes difficult to control for other 
factors that may change over the longer time period and for which reliable data do not exist. 
reflects freedom of association and collective bargaining rights. We cannot observe this 
variable directly. However, we have observations on the four indicators described above 
that provide information on the underlying variable. The four indicator variables are not 
perfect – the observations they provide contain errors which cause the indicators to 
deviate from the underlying variable. If we accept this way of thinking about the 
indicators, we can combine the information which they contain to produce a single index 
which is our ‘best guess’ of the unobserved underlying variable. 
 
 ‘Principal components’ analysis does just that. A technical summary of the 
technique is provided in the appendix. Intuitively, the composite index is estimated by 
minimizing the squared deviations (‘least squares’) between the indicators and the 
hypothetical underlying variable. The values of the underlying variable which best fit the 
information contained in the four indicator variables then become our estimates of the 
unobserved variable (in this case, a composite index of the rights to freedom of 
association and collective bargaining).15 To calculate the principal components, all 
variables must be standardized (i.e. adjusted so that the mean is equal to zero and the 
standard deviation equal to one). The principal components will likewise have a mean of 
zero and a standard deviation of one. To make the composite index similar in scale to the 
other indices examined here, we make one additional adjustment after calculating the 
principal components – we re-scale the indicator variable to take on values between 0 and 
10 (with 0 representing the lowest level of labor rights and 10 the highest).16 This 
becomes our index of freedom of association and collective bargaining rights. 
 
 Because all four indicators must be used to derive the principal components, we 
will only have index values for countries for which there is a complete set of 
observations. Unfortunately, the data on union density rates is less complete than the 
other three indicators. Therefore, we also construct an index of labor rights using only 
three of the four variables (excluding union density). This increases the number of 
observations in the regression analysis. Finally, we note that the correlation between the 
number of ILO conventions ratified and the other indicators is relatively weak. Therefore, 
we also use the principal components technique to construct an index only using 
Kucera’s indicator and the Freedom House index.  
 
 A table with the full set of indicators, including the indices constructed from the 
principal components, is contained in the appendix. 
 
 5. Results 
 
 In presenting the results of the regression analysis, we begin with the estimates 
based on each of the four indicators: Kucera’s index, the Freedom House index, union 
density (union members as a percentage of the total labor force), and the number of ILO 
                                                 
15    In terms of the technique described in the appendix, the first principal component is taken as the 
estimate of the ‘best fit’ – the one that minimizes the squared deviations. 
16    Because we include a squared term to capture non-linearities, the presence of negative values 
associated with the principal components (which have a mean of zero) distorts the values for the squared 
term. Rescaling the variable over a range of 0 to 10 solves this problem. 
Fundamental Conventions ratified. We examine the impact of these indicators on 
subsequent employment and real wage growth for two groups of countries: low- and 
middle-income countries (i.e. ‘developing’) and high-income countries (i.e. 
‘developed’).17 Afterwards, we discuss the regression results using the principal 
components based index of labor rights. 
 
 Note that non-linear relationships are captured by adding a squared term for the 
relevant labor rights variable. The results from non-linear estimates are only presented for 
a subset of the regressions. When the non-linear term is not statistically significant in the 
regressions for the three sets of countries (i.e. all countries, low- and middle-income 
countries, and high-income countries), the squared variable is not used in the regression 
and only the results from the simple linear specification are reported in the tables. 
 
 Tables 1.1 to 1.3 present the estimates of the impact of the four indicators on 
subsequent employment growth. Table 1.1 uses the full set of countries for which data is 
available from the sources used. Table 1.2 presents results for low- and middle-income 
countries only, and Table 1.3 presents results for high-income countries. In all cases, 
standard errors are shown in parentheses. Those results which are statistically significant 
at the 10 percent level or lower are exhibited in bold type. 
 
 In Table 1.1, the only indicator of freedom of association and collective 
bargaining that has a statistically significant impact on future employment growth is 
Kucera’s index. Note that the relationship is non-linear. Better labor rights raises the rate 
of employment growth, but this effect eventually declines as labor rights become 
stronger.18 None of the other three indicators has a statistically significant impact on 
employment growth. In all four cases, higher growth of output is associated with more 
rapid employment growth, although employment will grow at a proportionately lower 
rate than output. 
 
 Table 1.2 presents the same set of estimates, but limits the analysis to low- and 
middle-income countries. Now both Kucera’s index and the Freedom House index show 
statistically significant and positive impacts on employment growth. Again, the effect is 
positive, but declines as the rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining 
improve.19 Union density and ratified conventions do not have the same statistically 
                                                 
17    The country groupings ‘low income,’ ‘middle-income,’ and ‘high income’ were developed by the 
World Bank and are used to classify countries in the World Development Indicators Database. In 2006, 
high-income countries were defined as those having a gross national income (GNI) of $11,116 or higher. 
Low- and middle-income countries, conversely, had per capita incomes (measured by the GNI) of less than 
$11,116. We re-classified one country – Trinidad and Tobago – which was considered a high-income 
country in 2006 as middle-income country, since it fell into this group throughout much of the time period 
under consideration. We did not treat low-income countries separately from middle-income countries 
because of the lack of observations. 
18    The coefficient values in Table 1.1 suggest that the impact on employment growth is maximized when 
Kucera’s index reaches 5.1. The impact on employment growth would become negative if the index 
exceeds 10.3 – however, since the maximum value is 10, the impact on employment growth is positive 
throughout the range of the index. 
19    In these estimates, the impact on employment growth is maximized at a value of 4.5 for Kucera’s index 
and 4.7 for the Freedom House Index. The impact becomes negative when Kucera’s index exceeds 8.9 and 
significant impact on employment growth. In all cases, employment growth expands 
along with output growth. 
  
 Table 1.3 presents regression estimates for the set of high income countries in the 
sample.20 For these countries, none of the indicators of freedom of association and 
collective bargaining have a significant impact on employment growth. The growth of 
real output is the only variable with a statistically significant, and consistently positive, 
impact on employment. 
 
 
 
1.1 Employment. All countries. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 (1) Kucera (2) Freedom 
House 
(3) Union 
Density 
(4) ILO Fund. 
Conventions 
FACB 1.2216* 
(0.6425) 
1.0628 
(0.7217) 
0.0091 
(0.0185) 
-0.0043 
(0.2603) 
FACB2 -0.1191** 
(0.0578) 
-0.0938 
(0.0591) 
--- --- 
Output 0.4066** 
(0.1452) 
0.3614** 
(0.1561) 
0.3954** 
(0.1307) 
0.3402** 
(0.1496) 
Constant -2.928* 
(1.678) 
-3.149 
(2.2305) 
-1.0913 
(0.7976) 
-0.8867 
(1.5509) 
N 72 74 59 75 
R2-adj. 0.117 0.071 0.117 0.043 
* Statistically significant at 10% level. ** Statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
1.2 Employment. Low and middle income countries. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 (1) Kucera (2) Freedom 
House 
(3) Union 
Density 
(4) ILO Fund. 
Conventions 
FACB 2.1237** 
(0.9005) 
2.2916* 
(1.1477) 
-0.0249 
(0.0343) 
-0.0277 
(0.3868) 
FACB2 -0.2382** 
(0.0932) 
-0.2422** 
(0.1155) 
--- --- 
Output 0.3780* 
(0.1993) 
0.4236** 
(0.2045) 
0.3778* 
(0.1966) 
0.3161 
(0.2037) 
Constant -3.6152* 
(2.1112) 
-5.0598* 
(2.9706) 
-0.8733 
(1.2677) 
-0.6386 
(2.1914) 
N 45 48 33 49 
R2-adj. 0.131 0.085 0.062 0.100 
* Statistically significant at 10% level. ** Statistically significant at 10% level. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Freedom House index exceeds 9.5. Almost no low- and middle-income countries have index values that 
exceed these thresholds – i.e. the impact is positive over the relevant range. 
20   All the regressions for the subset of high-income countries have a limited number of observations. The 
number of observations could potentially be increased by combining labor market data from multiple 
sources. We avoided this option in order to minimize problems of comparability. As discussed later in the 
report, the number of observations could also be increased by developing consistent measurements of labor 
rights over time. 
1.3 Employment. High income countries. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 (1) Kucera (2) Freedom 
House 
(3) Union 
Density 
(4) ILO Fund. 
Conventions 
FACB -0.7262 
(1.3076) 
-0.7169 
(0.9634) 
0.0024 
(0.0126) 
0.0776 
(0.1577) 
FACB2 0.0589 
(0.0921) 
0.0476 
(0.0669) 
--- --- 
Output 0.5719** 
(0.1428) 
0.4217** 
(0.1520) 
0.5820** 
(0.1337) 
0.4517** 
(0.1322) 
Constant 0.2190 
(0.0432) 
1.2835 
(3.3527) 
-1.6274** 
(0.6053) 
-1.6654 
(0.9745) 
N 27 26 26 26 
R2-adj. 0.401 0.263 0.405 0.285 
* Statistically significant at 10% level. ** Statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
Tables 2.1 to 2.3 present the estimates of the impact of the four indicators on 
subsequent real wage growth. Once again, Table 2.1 uses the full set of countries for 
which data is available from the sources used; Table 2.2 includes only low- and middle-
income countries; and Table 2.3 shows results for high-income countries. 
 
2.1 Wages. All countries. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 (1) Kucera (2) Freedom 
House 
(3) Union 
Density 
(4) ILO Fund. 
Conventions 
FACB -0.1455 
(0.5467) 
0.0667 
(0.1693) 
0.0200 
(0.0142) 
0.2019 
(0.2366) 
FACB2 0.0253 
(0.0484) 
--- --- --- 
Output 0.2789** 
(0.1241) 
0.3549** 
(0.1404) 
0.1470 
(0.1098) 
0.3720** 
(0.1345) 
Constant -0.0467 
(1.3817) 
-0.1786 
(1.3616) 
03985 
(0.6203) 
-0.7872 
(1.3894) 
N 67 69 56 70 
R2-adj. 0.0460 0.061 0.028 0.080 
* Statistically significant at 10% level. ** Statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
2.2 Wages. Low and middle income countries. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 (1) Kucera (2) Freedom 
House 
(3) Union 
Density 
(4) ILO Fund. 
Conventions 
FACB -0.7192 
(0.7704) 
0.0968 
(0.2960) 
0.0409 
(0.0254) 
0.3646 
(0.3558) 
FACB2 0.0978 
(0.0777) 
--- --- --- 
Output 0.3228* 
(0.1757) 
0.3594* 
(0.1881) 
0.1169 
(0.1621) 
0.3893** 
(0.1812) 
Constant 0.4644 
(1.7414) 
-0.1749 
(1.8993) 
0.4606 
(0.9550) 
-1.4503 
(1.9821) 
N 42 45 31 46 
R2-adj. 0.075 0.039 0.041 0.070 
* Statistically significant at 10% level. ** Statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
2.3 Wages. High income countries. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 (1) Kucera (2) Freedom 
House 
(3) Union 
Density 
(4) ILO Fund. 
Conventions 
FACB 2.7298** 
(1.1458) 
0.2503* 
(0.1341) 
0.0107 
(0.0116) 
-0.0297 
(0.1495) 
FACB2 -0.1888** 
(0.0809) 
--- --- --- 
Output -0.0069 
(0.1210) 
0.2692* 
(0.1311) 
0.0351 
(0.1227) 
0.1587 
(0.1261) 
Constant -8.1191** 
(3.7468) 
-1.9622 
(1.3396) 
0.4212 
(0.5565) 
0.6268 
(0.9246) 
N 25 24 25 24 
R2-adj. 0.106 0.126 -0.047 -0.017 
* Statistically significant at 10% level. ** Statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
 
 The results presented in Table 2.1 are generally weak – none of the labor rights 
indicators has a significant impact on future wage growth. Output growth only has an 
impact on wage growth in two of the equations – the equations with Kucera’s index and 
the Freedom House index. The results for low- and middle income countries in Table 2.2 
are basically the same – no impact of freedom of association and collective bargaining on 
wage growth. 
 
 The results for high-income countries, however, are quite different. Both Kucera’s 
index and the Freedom House index have a positive impact on wage growth. Non-
linearities are apparent in the impact of Kucera’s measurement – the positive impact on 
wages eventually decreases as labor rights become stronger. The impact of output growth 
on wage growth is relatively weak in these regressions (it is only statistically significant 
in the regression utilizing the Freedom House index). 
 
 Comparing Tables 1.1 to 1.3 and Tables 2.1 to 2.3, we make a number of 
observations. First, neither the union density variable nor the convention ratification 
variable has a statistically significant impact on wage growth or employment growth.  We 
cannot tell from theses simple regressions whether this result is due to measurement (e.g. 
the indicators do a poor job at capturing freedom of association and collective bargaining 
rights) or due to the absence of any empirical relationship (i.e. no connection exists 
between unionization and aggregate wage and employment outcomes). Second, analyzing 
high-income countries separately from low- and middle-income countries is critical. 
Specifically, freedom and association and collective bargaining rights appear to impact 
employment outcomes in low- and middle-income countries, but wage outcomes in high-
income countries. 
 
 To explore these possibilities further, we now look at the results using the 
principal components (PC) based index of labor rights. Tables 3.1 to 3.3 examine the 
impact on employment growth. Three different PC indices are investigated: (1) one based 
on all four labor rights indicators; (2) one based on three indicators – excluding union 
density; and (3) one based on Kucera’s index and the Freedom House index. 
 
 Table 3.1 reports results using the full set of countries – combining high-, middle- 
and low-income countries. The results are mixed. The PC index using all four indicators 
(Equation 1 in Table 3.1) is not statistically significant.21 However, the regression 
estimates that include the 3-indicator PC index and the 2-indcator index show a 
statistically significant impact on future employment growth (Equation 2 in Table 3.1). 
As with the estimates from Tables 1.1 and 1.2, there is a non-linear relationship. The 
impact on employment growth eventually decreases as labor rights improve. In all 
equations, faster output growth is associated with faster employment growth. 
 
3.1 Employment. Principal component analysis. All countries. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 (1) All four 
indicators 
(2) Three 
indicators 
(3) Two 
indicators 
PC 1.2965 
(0.7970) 
1.5721* 
(0.9352) 
1.3324* 
(0.7356) 
PC2 -0.1155 
(0.0710) 
-0.1361* 
(0.0737) 
-0.1244** 
(0.0621) 
Output 0.4129** 
(0.1391) 
0.4281** 
(0.1580) 
0.3944** 
(0.1541) 
Constant -4.2953* 
(2.1804) 
-4.5798 
(2.9732) 
-3.3661 
(2.1699) 
N 57 70 70 
R2-adj. 0.114 0.103 0.110 
* Statistically significant at 10% level. ** Statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
3.2 Employment. Principal component analysis. Low and Middle Income Countries. Standard 
errors in parentheses. 
 (1) All four 
indicators 
(2) Three 
indicators 
(3) Two 
indicators 
PC 3.4791** 
(1.3692) 
3.3021** 
(1.4384) 
2.6934** 
(1.1024) 
PC2 -0.4064** 
(0.1520) 
-0.3384** 
(0.1374) 
-0.2975** 
(0.1135) 
Output 0.5332** 
(0.1946) 
0.5125** 
(0.2133) 
0.4586** 
(0.2046) 
Constant -7.9395** 
(3.1487) 
-7.7022* 
(3.9935) 
-5.3282* 
(2.8081) 
N 32 44 44 
R2-adj. 0.210 0.133 0.146 
* Statistically significant at 10% level. ** Statistically significant at 10% level. 
                                                 
21    It can be noted that the statistical significance of the coefficients on the PC index in Equation 1 in 
Table 3.1 is very close to 10%. 
 
3.3 Employment. Principal component analysis. High Income Countries. Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
 (1) All four 
indicators 
(2) Three 
indicators 
(3) Two 
indicators 
PC -0.2239 
(0.8716) 
-0.7575 
(1.4317) 
-1.9487* 
(1.1383) 
PC2 0.0179 
(0.0660) 
0.0529 
(0.0967) 
0.1325* 
(0.0771) 
Output 0.4193** 
(0.1389) 
0.4397** 
(0.1384) 
0.4371** 
(0.1296) 
Constant -0.4549 
(2.8506) 
1.2669 
(5.1003) 
5.4479 
(4.0818) 
N 25 26 26 
R2-adj. 0.238 0.255 0.334 
* Statistically significant at 10% level. ** Statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
 
Table 3.2 shows estimates for low- and middle-income countries. These results 
are significantly stronger. In all cases, improvements in labor rights, as measured by the 
various PC indices, are associated with faster employment growth. The coefficients are 
all statistically significant. The same non-linear pattern is evident in these estimates. 
Finally, output growth maintains its statistically significant impact on employment 
growth. 
 
 Table 3.3 presents the estimates for high-income countries. The contrast with 
Table 3.2 is striking. For the 4-indicator PC index and the 3-indicator PC index, there is 
no statistically significant impact on employment growth. For the 2-indicator PC index, 
there is a statistically significant impact, but the effect is the opposite of what it is in low- 
and middle-income countries. Higher index values (i.e. strong rights) reduce the growth 
rate of employment, although this negative effect becomes weaker as labor rights 
improve. 
 
 Tables 4.1 to 4.3 present similar estimates, but with wage growth as the dependent 
variable. In Table 4.1, the only statistically significant relationship is between output 
growth and real wage growth. None of the PC indices of labor rights has a significant 
impact on wage growth. The results in Table 4.2 are even weaker – none of the variables 
is statistically significant. Neither output growth nor labor rights appear to explain wage 
growth in developing countries. The contrast to the results on employment growth (Table 
3.2) is notable. 
 
 Table 4.3 shows the results for high-income countries. In this case, all the 
variables are statistically significant. The various PC-indices all have a positive impact on 
wage growth – although the non-linearities persist. Again – the contrast with the 
employment results (Table 3.3) is notable. Freedom of association and collective 
bargaining rights appear to improve employment growth in low- and middle-income 
countries, but have little impact on wages. In high-income countries, these labor rights 
appear to have the biggest impact on wages with little impact on employment. There is 
some evidence that, in high income countries, improved labor rights are associated with 
higher wage growth, but slower employment growth. However, the negative effect on 
employment is not evident in all the regressions. 
 
 In the wage regressions for low- and middle-income countries, there is some 
ambiguity as to whether to include the squared labor rights term (i.e. make the 
relationship non-linear) or not. In some cases, the linear model yields better results in 
terms of statistical significance. Table 5.1 presents estimates which parallel those in 
Table 4.2, but specifically exclude the squared PC-index. In the first equation of Table 
5.1 – the one which uses the 4-indicator PC index – the impact of this indicator is 
statistically significant and positive – i.e. strong labor rights appear to improve the 
growth rate of wages. However, this result does not carry through to the regressions using 
other PC indices. Moreover, this is the only regression estimate for low- and middle-
income countries which shows a significant, positive impact of labor rights on wage 
growth – i.e. the finding is not robust to the inclusion of alternative measurements or 
alterative specifications (i.e. non-linear). 
 
4.1 Wages. Principal component analysis. All countries. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 (1) All four 
indicators 
(2) Three 
indicators 
(3) Two 
indicators 
PC 0.8266 
(0.7261) 
0.4033 
(0.9260) 
-0.0472 
(0.6542) 
PC2 -0.0579 
(0.0633) 
-0.0110 
(0.0713) 
0.0182 
(0.0543) 
Output 0.1926* 
(0.1137) 
0.3102** 
(0.1294) 
0.3046** 
(0.1309) 
Constant -1.7646 
(1.9133) 
-2.1267 
(2.8388) 
-0.5381 
(1.8626) 
N 54 65 65 
R2-adj. 0.0332 0.062 0.046 
* Statistically significant at 10% level. ** Statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
4.2 Wages. Principal component analysis. Low and Middle Income Countries. Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
 (1) All four 
indicators 
(2) Three 
indicators 
(3) Two 
indicators 
PC -0.5107 
(1.3334) 
-1.1049 
(1.4790) 
-0.7089 
(0.9932) 
PC2 0.1230 
(0.1403) 
0.1472 
(0.1337) 
0.0978 
(0.0989) 
Output 0.1036 
(0.1610) 
0.2914 
(0.1758) 
0.2969 
(0.1805) 
Constant 0.8056 
(2.9541) 
1.0778 
(4.001) 
0.5684 
(2.4702) 
N 30 41 41 
R2-adj. 0.089 0.084 0.042 
* Statistically significant at 10% level. ** Statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
4.3 Wages. Principal component analysis. High Income Countries. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 (1) All four 
indicators 
(2) Three 
indicators 
(3) Two 
indicators 
PC 1.6018** 
(0.7532) 
3.5214** 
(1.1076) 
3.5390** 
(0.7932) 
PC2 -0.1089* 
(0.0570) 
-0.2284** 
(0.0748) 
-0.2257** 
(0.0538) 
Output 0.2400* 
(0.1189) 
0.2367** 
(0.1065) 
0.2143** 
(0.0900) 
Constant -5.2185** 
(2.4566) 
-12.4754** 
(3.9392) 
-12.8292** 
(2.8388) 
N 24 24 24 
R2-adj. 0.174 0.310 0.497 
* Statistically significant at 10% level. ** Statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
 
 Another interesting result from Table 4.2 is that output growth has no impact on 
real wage growth in these regressions for low- and middle-income countries. The fact that 
none of the variables in Table 4.2 explain wage growth raises the question – what drives 
wage growth in developing countries? One of the most important variables for explaining 
wage differentials between rich and poor countries is the level of productivity (Rodrik, 
1996). Therefore, we expect that productivity growth could explain wage growth in our 
collection of low- and middle-income countries. Table 5.2 presents the same regressions 
as in Table 5.1, but replaces output growth by productivity growth. In this case, 
productivity growth is measured as the average growth rate in real output per worker 
from 1996 to 2006. The results in Table 5.2 are clear – faster productivity growth is 
associated with higher growth rates of real wages. When productivity growth is added to 
the regression, the statistical significance of the PC indices weakens.  
 
5.1 Wages. Principal component analysis. Low and middle income countries. Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
 (1) All four 
indicators 
(2) Three 
indicators 
(3) Two 
indicators 
PC 0.6270** 
(0.3051) 
0.4831 
(0.3288) 
0.2308 
(0.2879) 
Output 0.1097 
(0.1601) 
0.3035* 
(0.1759) 
0.2998 
(0.1804) 
Constant -1.4273 
(1.4902) 
-2.7362 
(2.0066) 
-1.2228 
(1.6785) 
N 30 41 41 
R2-adj. 0.097 0.079 0.043 
* Statistically significant at 10% level. ** Statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
5.2 Wages. Principal component analysis. Low and Middle Income Countries. Standard errors in 
parentheses. 
 (1) All four 
indicators 
(2) Three 
indicators 
(3) Two 
indicators 
PC 0.3433 
(0.2441) 
0.2294 
(0.2547) 
0.0071 
(0.2210) 
Productivity 0.4844** 
(0.1107) 
0.6016** 
(0.1051) 
0.6192** 
(0.1068) 
Constant -1.3042 
(1.1080) 
-1.9472 
(1.4724) 
-0.7517 
(1.2178) 
N 30 41 41 
R2-adj. 0.463 0.467 0.455 
* Statistically significant at 10% level. ** Statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
 
6. Discussion and implications 
 
The results presented in the previous section represent an effort to use existing 
indicators to examine the effects freedom of association and collective bargaining rights 
have on labor market outcomes – specifically, employment and real wage growth.  From 
these findings, we can make a number of observations, keeping in mind the 
methodological challenges of conducting such exercises. 
 
• The impact of freedom of association and collective bargaining rights appears to 
be different for developing (low- and middle-income) countries compared to high-
income countries. These groups of countries should be analyzed separately – 
combining countries at different levels of economic development into one large 
dataset could lead to misleading inferences. 
• The results of the analysis are sensitive to the indicator used. In our estimates, 
union density and number of ILO conventions ratified did not yield statistically 
significant results, while other indicators did. This could suggest that the poorly 
performing indicators did not accurately capture the strength of labor rights. 
Alternative, union density and ILO conventions may capture other aspects of the 
labor rights environment which have a weaker (or negligible) impact on labor 
market outcomes. 
• It appears that non-linearities are important to take into account. The impact of 
freedom of association and collective bargaining rights may not be uniform across 
the entire range of the indices used to quantify the strength of these rights.  
• Techniques such as principal components analysis may prove useful for 
combining information from multiple indicators of labor rights. 
 
The results of the analysis suggest that freedom of association and collective 
bargaining rights improve the growth rate of manufacturing employment in low- and 
middle-income countries, but have little impact on the growth rate of average wages in 
manufacturing. The results presented here do not support the argument that labor rights 
undermine employment opportunities in developing countries. The results are quite 
distinct for high-income countries:  freedom of association and collective bargaining 
rights appear to have a direct impact on future wage growth. There is some evidence that 
stronger labor rights may negative affect employment growth, but this finding is neither 
robust nor conclusive. 
 
 Why might we observe a different impact of the rights to freedom of association 
and collective bargaining in developing countries when compared to high-income 
economies? One possibility is that the institutions that enable workers to exercise these 
rights in the workplace are less well developed in lower-income countries relative to 
high-income countries. In high-income countries, well-established collective bargaining 
institutions allow organized labor to negotiate more effectively over contracts and wage 
rates. In developing countries, such institutions are not as strong (or limited to specific 
firms or workplaces). At the same time, basic labor rights could have indirect positive 
effects that increase the rate of employment growth for a given growth rate in output. For 
example, better industrial relations, reduced turnover, and skills development may reduce 
non-wage costs of labor and encourage firms to employ more workers – i.e. production 
tends to be more labor intensive in an environment of better and more predictable labor 
relations. Since we do not have consistent data on changes in hours of work over time, an 
alternative explanation is that stronger labor rights limit pressures to lengthen the 
workday and thereby increase the growth rate of employment for a given growth rate of 
output.22 Our analysis does not shed light on the specific factors that would cause the 
observed difference between developed and developing countries, so the explanations 
given here for the positive employment effects are speculative. 
 
 Institutional differences could explain, at least in part, the non-linearities observed 
with regard to freedom of association and collective bargaining rights. For example, in 
high-income countries, we expect that collective bargaining institutions will change as 
the indices of labor rights improve. In countries with very high scores, more centralized 
systems of collective bargaining are often present. In these cases, aggregate labor market 
outcomes (e.g. economy-wide employment) may be taken into account – e.g. wage 
demands may be moderated as a way of protecting fuller levels of employment. This 
could explain the decline in the effect on wages of the indices of collective bargaining 
and freedom of association in some of the regression results. 
 
 Linking the quantitative analysis of labor rights indices to specific institutional 
changes is beyond the scope of the paper, and would involve more qualitative 
assessments of the institutions which help support the realization of the rights to freedom 
                                                 
22    As Freeman (2009) notes, if labor rights have positive employment effects, this could imply that labor 
rights have a negative impact on labor productivity. This observation is applicable to the estimates 
presented here which show that labor rights have a positive employment effect for a given rate of output 
growth in low- and middle-income countries, particularly if we assume that labor rights have no impact on 
hours worked per individual employee.  The estimates presented here (e.g. in Table 3.2) also show that a 1 
percent increase in output growth is associated with about a 0.5 percent increase in employment – i.e. 
approximately half the growth in output is achieved through higher productivity, not employing more 
workers. Therefore, if better labor rights create a more stable economic environment which also raises 
output growth (i.e. by encouraging investment), this could compensate for the slower growth of 
productivity suggested by our results.  
of association and collective bargaining. Nevertheless, it is an important area for future 
work. 
 
 In terms of policy implications, the analysis presented here does not support the 
argument that stronger labor rights will undermine employment opportunities – 
particularly in manufacturing and other tradable sectors. For low- and middle-income 
countries, the evidence suggests a positive relationship between labor rights and 
employment growth. For high-income countries, stronger labor rights appear to impact 
wage growth, but the effect on employment is ambiguous. This could be because 
productivity rises with higher wages – mitigating or eliminating any potential effect from 
labor costs. As mentioned above, the results which suggest that the marginal wage effect 
declines as freedom of association and collective bargaining rights get stronger may 
indicate that collective bargaining strategies take into account a broader range of issues 
when labor rights are strengthened. The analysis presented here does not allow us to cast 
any judgment as to whether these, or other, explanations are the correct ones.  However, 
these findings provide little support to the argument that basic labor rights may 
undermine employment opportunities, particularly in developing countries. 
 
7. Limitations, caveats, and future directions 
 
 The analysis presented here is preliminary in the sense that data improvements 
will facilitate additional research that should allow us to draw firmer, more definitive 
conclusions. There are a number of caveats that should be kept in mind when interpreting 
the results presented in this report and when attempting to draw out broader lessons. 
Perhaps most important – there are data limitations, particularly in developing countries, 
that apply to all the variables considered here – labor rights, wages, and employment. 
These limitations have been discussed at some length earlier in the report. However, they 
bear repeating. Quantitative indices of labor rights – including those of freedom of 
association and collective bargaining – are challenging to assemble, due to incomplete 
data, different institutional settings, de facto v. de jure distinctions, and the problem of 
actually observing labor rights in practice. Employment can be a murky concept in 
contexts of widespread informality, self-employment, and underemployment. Labor 
rights, traditionally defined, do not apply equally to all forms of employment. Accurate 
data on wages and earnings over time is difficult to assemble. Averages hide distinctions 
due to occupation or skills. 
 
 We tried to minimize these limitations by focusing on one category of 
employment – manufacturing – and by exploring multiple indicators of labor rights. 
Manufacturing employment and wages may provide a relatively good indication of the 
impact of labor standards on labor market outcomes. However, it is important to keep in 
mind that such employment represents a fraction of the total labor market – and in 
developing countries, often a relatively small fraction of total employment. So we must 
exercise caution in trying to draw out generalities from this analysis. 
  
Ideally, we would like to look at the impact of labor rights over time. That is, are 
changes in the rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining associated with 
specific changes in labor market outcomes? Unfortunately, at the current time, the 
indicators of labor rights used in our analysis are not consistently available over time for 
a large number of countries – specifically, low- and middle-income countries.  In this 
report, we looked at whether labor rights – as they exist at a particular moment in time – 
impact subsequent employment or wage growth. However, in the future it would be 
helpful to construct panel data (cross-country and over time) in order to broaden the 
analysis. For example, the short-run effects of changes in labor rights could be compared 
to longer-run impacts based on the overall levels of such rights. 
 
As with much analysis along these lines, there are potential problems of 
endogeneity  – does employment growth lead to better rights or does the causality run in 
the reverse direction? In the analysis presented in this report, we tried to limit problems 
of endogeneity by looking at initial conditions with regard to rights and subsequent labor 
market outcomes. It is difficult to argue that future growth of employment or wages could 
have caused labor rights in the past. But, putting the specific analysis presented here 
aside, clearly more work is needed on multi-directional causality. 
 
One limitation of doing the kind of cross-country analysis presented here is that 
the relationship between labor rights and labor market outcomes may be spurious or 
indirect. For example, suppose unobserved factors existed which were correlated with 
both labor rights and subsequent employment growth. Since these factors are not 
observed, it is difficult to control for them in cross-country regressions. However, they 
could result in finding a robust link between labor rights and employment, when the real 
relationship is between the unobserved variables and employment. This is one of the 
limitations of cross-country regressions. These problems can be addressed, at least to 
some extent, by using panel datasets that include observations on labor rights over time. 
If such data exist, fixed effects analysis, or another error components technique, could be 
used in an attempt to control for unobservable country-specific factors.  As discussed 
above, we lack data on changes in labor rights over time for a large number of countries 
and therefore did not use these estimation techniques. Cross-country regressions have 
been used extensively for economic analysis (e.g. in empirical growth models) and such 
analysis can shed light on a number of interesting relationships. Nevertheless, the results 
cannot be taken as definitive, merely suggestive, for the reasons given here. 
 
 From these observations, it is clear that one of the biggest limitations encountered 
in examining the relationship between labor rights (especially those of freedom of 
association and collective bargaining) and labor market outcomes is a lack of consistent 
and reliable information over time that captures both de jure and de facto aspects of labor 
rights. For these reasons, efforts to improve the quality of information and to develop 
time series estimates of labor rights will make better research possible.  
 
Our review of methods for measuring labor rights suggests that multiple 
approaches may be needed to capture the various aspects of the rights to freedom of 
association and collective bargaining (e.g. the laws in place, the violations of rights on 
the ground, outcome indicators – such as union density, and expert assessments). Each 
method has its positive sides and its limitations. As described in this report, statistical 
techniques can be used to attempt to extract information and minimize errors, thereby 
producing composite measurements of labor rights. However, such composite indices can 
only be produced if the component indicators are available. Once again, we return to the 
critical issue of improving the availability of reliable and consistent information as the 
most important step for opening doors to better research in the future.  
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Appendix 
 
Principal components: technical description 
 
The technique of principal components can be used to reduce the dimensionality 
of a matrix of observations (X) on a common underlying phenomon – in this case, the 
rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining. The columns of X represent 
the ‘n’ observations on each of ‘t’ variables (i.e. X is an n x t matrix). For the index of 
labor rights used in the analysis, the first principal component was selected from which to 
construct the index. The first principal component, p1, minimizes tr(X-p1v1)′ (X-p1v1) in 
which v1 is the eigenvector of the X′X matrix associated with the largest eigenvalue. The 
first principal component, therefore, reflects the ‘best’ linear summary of the component 
variables in the sense of minimizing the sum of squared deviations and maximizing the 
captured variation of the component variables. Because it minimizes squared deviations, 
the principal component is distinct from other linear combinations of variables which 
may be used to combine different indicators (e.g. averaging the variables). 
 
To calculate the principal components, each column of X must be transformed 
into a standardized variable by subtracting the mean from the individual values in each 
column and dividing by the standard deviation of the elements of the same column  – i.e. 
the values in each column will have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Once 
the variables have been standardized, a covariance matrix is calculated (the covariance of 
each of the variables in X with itself and the other variables). The covariance matrix is 
then used to calculate a matrix of eigenvectors and an associated vector of eigenvalues. 
As noted above, the eigenvector with the largest eigenvalue is used to compute the first 
principal component. This first principal component accounts for the largest share of the 
variance of the variables in matrix X. 
 
In the analysis conducted in the report, three indices were estimated using this 
technique. The first used all four indicator variables discussed in Section 4.1 and, in this 
case, the first principal component accounted for 60 percent of the variance in the 
component variables. The second index excluded the union density variable. In this 
second case, the first principal component accounted for 63 percent of the variance of the 
component variables. The third index used the first principal component associated with 
Kucera’s FACB index and the Freedom House Index of Civil Liberties. In this third case, 
the first principal component accounted for 85 percent of the variance. 
 
Table A1.  Indicators of Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining Rights 
  Kucera 
Freedom 
House 
Union 
density 
ILO 
conv. PC1 PC2 PC3 
  
(scale 0-
10) 
(scale 0-
10) (percent) 
(scale 0-
7) 
(scale 0-
10) 
(scale 0-
10) 
(scale 0-
10) 
  
mid 
1990s mid1990s 1990s 1995       
Albania 5.5 5.0   4.0   5.3 5.2 
Azerbaijan 9.1 2.1   6.0   6.3 5.4 
Argentina 2.6 6.7 21.5 6.0 4.5 5.6 4.7 
Australia 7.4 10.0 41.7 6.0 7.6 8.8 8.8 
Austria 10.0 10.0 45.9 6.0 8.5 9.8 10.0 
Armenia   5.0   2.0       
Belgium 9.1 9.6 57.9 7.0 8.8 9.7 9.4 
Bolivia 1.4 6.3 16.4 5.0 3.6 4.6 3.9 
Botswana 7.4 7.5 8.6 0.0 4.0 5.4 7.5 
Brazil 3.8 5.0 24.8 5.0 4.1 5.0 4.4 
Bulgaria 6.2 7.9 59.7 6.0 7.2 7.5 7.1 
Cameroon 3.1 3.3   6.0   4.5 3.2 
Canada 8.6 10.0 28.1 4.0 6.9 8.5 9.4 
Sri Lanka 6.1 3.3 17.4 4.0 3.7 4.8 4.7 
Chile 5.9 8.3 13.1 3.0 4.8 6.3 7.1 
China 0.0 0.0 15.5 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Colombia 0.0 5.0 7.0 6.0 2.7 4.0 2.6 
Costa Rica 2.6 8.3 15.0 7.0 5.1 6.7 5.6 
Croatia 6.8 5.0   6.0   6.6 5.8 
Cyprus 8.6 10.0 52.7 6.0 8.3 9.3 9.4 
Denmark 8.2 10.0 71.1 6.0 8.9 9.1 9.1 
Ecuador 2.8 6.3 13.5 6.0 4.2 5.5 4.6 
Fiji 5.2 6.7   3.0   5.4 6.0 
Finland 9.5 10.0 77.9 7.0 9.7 10.0 9.8 
France 8.9 8.3 7.6 7.0 6.6 9.1 8.6 
Greece 9.1 6.7 11.6 7.0 6.3 8.5 7.8 
Guatemala 2.5 3.8 4.4 7.0 3.2 4.8 3.1 
Hong Kong 5.0   19.8         
Hungary 6.8 8.3 78.7 6.0 8.2 7.9 7.6 
Iceland 9.1 10.0   6.0   9.4 9.6 
India 5.3 5.0 5.6 3.0 3.3 4.8 5.2 
Indonesia 1.0 2.1 2.8 3.0 1.1 2.0 1.6 
Iran 0.0 0.0   4.0   1.2 0.0 
 
Table A1.  Indicators of Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining Rights, cont. 
 Kucera 
Freedom 
House 
Union 
density 
ILO 
conv. PC1 PC2 PC3 
Ireland 10.0 9.2 34.2 6.0 7.8 9.4 9.6 
Israel 6.7 6.7 20.1 7.0 5.9 7.6 6.7 
Italy 9.5 7.9 41.9 7.0 7.8 9.2 8.7 
Jamaica 8.5 6.7 16.3 6.0 6.0 7.9 7.5 
Japan 6.4 8.3 19.9 4.0 5.5 6.9 7.4 
Jordan 6.7 5.0   5.0   6.1 5.8 
Korea 2.9 8.3 7.5 0.0 2.9 4.0 5.7 
Kuwait 3.5 3.3 3.2 4.0 2.5 3.9 3.4 
Kyrgystan   5.8   6.0       
Latvia 9.1 7.9   5.0   8.2 8.5 
Lithuania 6.8 7.5   6.0   7.6 7.2 
Luxembourg 9.5 10.0 59.4 6.0 8.8 9.6 9.8 
Malawi 5.0 5.8   3.0   5.0 5.5 
Malaysia 2.2 3.3 9.6 2.0 1.8 2.6 2.8 
Malta 9.5 10.0 57.9 7.0 9.1 10.0 9.8 
Mauritius 6.4 8.3 17.5 4.0 5.4 6.9 7.4 
Moldova   4.6   1.0       
Morocco 3.7 3.3 6.4 5.0 2.9 4.3 3.5 
Netherlands 9.5 10.0 25.6 7.0 8.0 10.0 9.8 
New 
Zealand 9.1 10.0 43.4 4.0 7.6 8.6 9.6 
Norway 8.6 10.0 55.4 7.0 8.7 9.7 9.4 
Panama 5.2 6.7 14.2 6.0 5.0 6.6 6.0 
Peru 2.0 5.0 12.9 6.0 3.5 4.8 3.6 
Philippines 2.0 5.4 11.4 5.0 3.3 4.5 3.8 
Poland 8.2 8.3 43.0 7.0 7.6 8.8 8.3 
Portugal 10.0 10.0 35.0 6.0 8.1 9.8 10.0 
Qatar 0.0 1.7   1.0   0.7 0.9 
Romania 4.3 6.3 43.1 6.0 5.6 6.1 5.3 
Russia 4.0 5.0 95.5 6.0 6.9 5.5 4.5 
Senegal 5.9 3.8 2.2 6.0 3.9 5.7 4.8 
Singapore 8.2 3.3 14.0 2.0 3.6 4.8 5.7 
Slovenia 8.0 8.3   6.0   8.4 8.2 
South Africa 5.5 7.1 18.8 0.0 3.6 4.5 6.3 
Spain 8.0 8.3 10.1 7.0 6.5 8.8 8.2 
Suriname 9.5 6.7   3.0   7.1 8.0 
Sweden 9.5 10.0 85.3 7.0 10.0 10.0 9.8 
Syria 0.0 0.0 5.0 6.0 1.1 2.0 0.0 
 
 
Table A1.  Indicators of Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining Rights, cont. 
 Kucera 
Freedom 
House 
Union 
density 
ILO 
conv. PC1 PC2 PC3 
Trinidad/ 
Tobago 9.5 8.8 22.0 5.0 6.9 8.7 9.1 
Tunisia 6.5 3.3 10.0 7.0 4.4 6.2 4.9 
Turkey 0.7 3.8 8.8 5.0 2.3 3.3 2.3 
Ukraine 5.0     6.0       
Macedonia 
(FYR)   6.7 55.3 6.0       
Egypt 4.6 5.0 24.0 6.0 4.6 5.7 4.8 
UK  4.1 8.3 33.9 5.0 5.6 6.5 6.3 
USA 4.7 10.0 13.7 1.0 4.5 5.8 7.5 
Uruguay 8.6 8.3 16.3 7.0 6.9 9.0 8.5 
Yemen 5.0 2.1   6.0   4.7 3.5 
Source: See text. 
 
 
